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“A popular government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a 
tragedy. . . . [A] people who mean to be their own 
governors must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The above quote by James Madison2 embodies the core 
 
       †     J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008; B.A., Evergreen 
State College, 1995.  
 1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 3 LETTERS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 276 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865), quoted 
in Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 735 n.5 (Minn. 2002). 
 2. Not surprisingly, this quote often appears in commentary and case law 
discussing open government issues.  See e.g., David J. Barthel, A Healthy Tan Is Better 
than Sunburn: Ohio’s “Sunshine Law” and Nonpublic Collective Inquiry Sessions, 34 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2005); Theresa M. Nuckolls, Kansas Sunshine Law; How 
Bright Does It Shine Now? The Kansas Open Meetings Act, 72 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 34, 45 
(2003). 
1
Riach: Civil Procedure—Epilogue to a Farce: Reestablishing the Power of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
8. RIACH - RC.DOC 3/7/2007  1:26:07 PM 
682 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
principles underlying Minnesota’s open meeting law.3  
Unfortunately, the need for “popular information” occasionally 
conflicts with the practical realities of running a government.4  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court recently resolved just such a conflict in 
Prior Lake American v. Mader, a case in which the protections of 
attorney-client privilege proved incompatible with the public 
interest in open government.5 
The societal interests underlying attorney-client privilege and 
open government clash when public access to information 
compromises officials’ ability to litigate effectively.6  Some 
commentators argue that it is unfair and economically inefficient 
to resolve this clash by construing public officials’ use of attorney-
client privilege more narrowly than private parties’ use.7  The Prior 
Lake court rejected this argument.8  The court refused to develop a 
bright-line rule allowing public officials recourse to the privilege 
exception whenever litigation looms.9  Instead, the court validated 
the use of a case-by-case balancing test to determine when the 
privilege exception to the open meeting law is appropriate.10  
Unfortunately, the court’s use of this test depended on broad and 
 
 3. Minnesota’s open meeting law is codified at Minnesota Statutes section 
13D.01 (2004). 
 4. See MINN. STAT. § 13D.05 subdiv. 3 (2004) (listing six specific exceptions 
where the practical concerns of running the government outweigh the public’s 
interest in open meetings). 
 5. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 731. 
 6. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 310 
Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976) (“A basic understanding of the 
adversary system indicates that certain phases of litigation strategy may be 
impaired if every discussion is available for the benefit of opposing parties who 
may have as a purpose a private gain in contravention to the public need as 
construed by the agency.”). 
 7. “Attorneys representing government actors need to be placed on equal 
footing with attorneys representing private clients who seek to further their 
clients’ individual interests.”  Marion J. Radson & Elizabeth A. Waratuke, The 
Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges of Government Entities, 30 STETSON L. REV. 
799, 820–21 (2001).  See generally Todd A. Ellinwood, “In the Light of Reason and 
Experience”: The Case for a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
1291, 1292 (2001) (arguing for an expansion of the privilege to avoid 
disadvantaging government attorneys and, as a result, exposing the public to 
excess cost). 
 8. “[U]nlike persons in private life, a public agency . . . has no autonomous 
right of confidentiality in communications relating to governmental business.”  
Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 737 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b (1998)). 
 9. Id. at 738. 
 10. Id. 
2
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undefined policy rationales and thus gave practitioners little 
guidance on how to counsel their government clients to remain in 
compliance with the law. 
This note begins with an abridged history of the conflict 
between attorney-client privilege and open government.11  It follows 
this discussion with an examination and analysis of Prior Lake’s 
resolution of this conflict.12  This note concludes that the Prior Lake 
resolution provides an effective analytic framework for courts, but 
does not help legal practitioners determine when they may close 
meetings under the privilege exception.13 
II. HISTORY 
A. Open Meeting Laws 
Open meeting laws (or “sunshine laws”) require that 
government bodies and agencies open their meetings to the public 
and provide the public with notice as to when those meetings will 
be held.14  They are a modern phenomenon; most open meeting 
laws were enacted during the 1950s as a result of organized 
advocacy by journalists and civic groups.15  Before 1952, Alabama 
was the only state that had enacted an open meeting law.16  By 
1962, twenty-six other states had followed suit.17  Today, all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia have open meeting statutes of 
one form or another.18  These laws reflect the view that open 
government promotes honest, efficient, and informed decision 
making and inspires public confidence.19  Typically, these laws 
 
 11. See infra Parts II, III. 
 12. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
 14. See Teresa D. Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in 
the Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1165, 1165 (1993).  See also John F. O’Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly 
Required: The Application of State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 719, 719 (2004). 
 15. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 
HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (1962) [hereinafter Right to Know]. 
 16. Id. at 1199–1200.  Florida enacted an open meeting statute in 1905, but it 
applied only to city councils.  See Peter H. Seed, Florida’s Sunshine Law: The 
Undecided Legal Issue, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 215 (2002). 
 17. Right to Know, supra note 15, at 1199. 
 18. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1167. 
 19. See Note, The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years—A Second 
Look, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 375, 377 (1979) [hereinafter Minnesota Open Meeting 
3
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apply to municipal bodies and public agencies but not state 
legislatures. 
The general trend in the development of state open meeting 
laws has been one of statutory enactments book-ending periods of 
judicial interpretation.  Courts have tended to narrowly construe 
the laws' requirement of openness.  These narrow constructions 
have in turn inspired legislatures to amend the laws, broadening 
the laws' applicability and minimizing or eliminating judicially 
created exceptions to their mandates.20  Legislatures have also 
instituted various notice and reporting requirements designed to 
guarantee some measure of transparency even when meetings 
could be closed.21  These new statutory provisions have led to 
further litigation that has forced courts to revise or refine their 
earlier rulings.22 
Twenty-five states have incorporated “purpose statements” into 
their open meeting laws.23  These purpose statements evince the 
 
Law]. 
 20. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1176–77.  See generally Peter G. Guthrie, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Making Public 
Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1070 (2006). 
 21. Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1170–73.  For instance, Minnesota’s open 
meeting law requires the posting of irregularly scheduled meeting notices on a 
public bulletin board, as well as mailings to any person who has requested notice 
of meeting times and places, even when the meeting is to be closed.  MINN. STAT. § 
13D.04, subdivs. 2, 5 (2004).  It also requires officials to describe for the record 
why the meeting is to be closed, and the subject to be discussed in the closed 
meeting, before adjourning into a closed session.  § 13D.01, subdiv. 3.   
 22. See Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 503–05 (Cal. 1993) 
(interpreting amendments to the “Brown Act,” California’s open meeting law); 
Sch. Bd. of Duval County v. Fla. Publ’g Co., 670 So. 2d 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(interpreting what was then Florida’s new statutory attorney-client privilege 
exception); McKay v. Bd. of City Comm’rs, 746 P.2d 124, 125–26 (Nev. 1987) 
(listing a number of statutory exemptions enacted over the history of the open 
meeting law, and then applying the new legislatively created government privilege 
exception); Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tex. App. 1997) 
(interpreting Texas’ then recently enacted attorney-client privilege exception); see 
also Gerald A. Daniel, Jr., Some Time in the Shade: Giving the Public’s Legal Counsel 
Some Relief Under Alabama’s Sunshine Law, 9 T.G. JONES L. REV. 55, 72 (2005) 
(explaining how Alabama’s new open meeting legislation derives from recent case 
law); Nuckolls, supra note 2, at 37 (asserting that the Kansas legislature refined the 
statutory definition of “meeting” in reaction to a Kansas Supreme Court decision); 
Seed, supra note 16, at 218–60 (charting the interplay between statutory 
enactments and judicial interpretations of the “per se board rule”). 
 23. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.312 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2006); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-2340 (2006); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 120/1 (West 2005); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-1 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.1 (West 2006); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.800 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/8
8. RIACH - RC.DOC 3/7/2007  1:26:07 PM 
2007] PRIOR LAKE AMERICAN V. MADER 685 
policy interests buttressing the laws, and tend to be written in broad 
and sweeping abstractions.24  They often refer to the principle of 
popular sovereignty—the idea that governments (and their 
decisions) achieve legitimacy through the consent of the 
governed.25  Purpose statements also often refer to what one 
commentator labeled “the normative concept of transparency.”26  
This concept is embodied in language such as that found in 
Pennsylvania’s open meeting law, which reads, “the right of the 
public to be present at all meetings of agencies and to witness the 
deliberation, policy formation and decision-making of agencies is 
vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of the democratic 
process.”27  The legislatures’ reliance on this “normative concept” 
to justify open government reveals an assumption that citizens will 
actually make use of “popular information” to ensure effective and 
 
REV. STAT ANN. § 42:4:1 (2006); MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-501 (LexisNexis 
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.110 (West 2006); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 241.010 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 
(McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.9 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 25, § 302 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.620 (West 2003); 65 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
8-44-101 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-102 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-9A-1 
(LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.81 (West 2003).  See also Pupillo, supra note 
14, at 1185 n.137. 
 24. For example, the Mississippi purpose statement reads, in part: 
It [is] essential to the fundamental philosophy of the American 
constitutional form of representative government and to the 
maintenance of a democratic society that public business be performed 
in an open and public manner, and that citizens be advised of and be 
aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and 
decisions that go into the making of public policy . . . . 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (2006).  The Oklahoma legislature justified its law with 
a shorter but no less abstract statement: “It is the public policy of the State of 
Oklahoma to encourage and facilitate an informed citizenry’s understanding of 
the governmental processes and governmental problems.”  25 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
25, § 302 (West 2006). 
 25. California legislators wrote an exceptionally strong statement of purpose 
into their open meeting law: 
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies 
which serve them.  The people, in delegating authority, do not give their 
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know 
and what is good for them not to know.  The people insist on remaining 
informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have 
created. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2006). 
 26. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 885 (2006). 
 27. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2006). 
5
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efficient governance.28 
Perhaps sensing that “transparency” is a weak foundation for 
the right to open government, commentators have urged courts to 
locate that right in the firmer ground of the First Amendment, but 
to no avail.29  Courts have instead deferred to legislatures and 
grounded open meeting law decisions in the abstract policy 
rationales noted above.30  The choice of a policy foundation over a 
constitutional foundation has implications when courts weigh 
enforcement of open meeting laws in the face of contradictory 
statutes or common law rules.  In general, the result of this process 
has been hesitant and inconsistent enforcement by the courts.31 
Most open meeting laws contain exceptions that allow agencies 
to close meetings when specific criteria have been satisfied.32  One 
common exception allows for closed meetings where the 
government’s attorney-client privilege might otherwise be 
compromised.33 
B. The Government Attorney-Client Privilege 
Use of the attorney-client privilege dates back to the sixteenth 
century.34  Though the basic function of the attorney-client 
privilege has not changed much since its inception, its policy 
justifications have evolved.  Originally meant to protect the 
attorney’s oath by precluding him from testifying against a client, it 
 
 28. Professor Fenster writes, “[as] a descriptive concept claimed to be at the 
core of democracy, transparency fails to consider the tensions it conceals.  It 
assumes too much of the state, of government information, and of the public . . . .”  
Fenster, supra note 26, at 892. 
 29. Right to Know, supra note 15, at 1204. 
 30. Id.  See also Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 380. 
 31. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1176. 
 32. See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 400–10.  See also Jay M. 
Zitter, Annotation, Pending or Prospective Litigation Exception Under State Law Making 
Proceedings by Public Bodies Open to the Public, 35 A.L.R.5th 113 (1996).  Common 
exceptions include employee disciplinary proceedings, criminal investigations, 
meetings to discuss land acquisitions or labor contracts, and meetings of quasi-
judicial bodies, as well as meetings pertaining to pending or ongoing litigation.  Id. 
 33. Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege 
the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 504 (2002).  Four states contain no attorney-client 
privilege exception to their open meeting law: Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
and Nevada.  In these states, all meetings between municipal government officials 
and their attorneys must be open to the public.  Id. at 504, 550 n.174. 
 34. Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] Lawyer May Be 
Held Against You—The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 URB. 
LAW. 283–84 (2003). 
6
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now serves primarily to promote full communication and disclosure 
by clients to their attorneys.35 
Two sets of rules protect confidential communications 
between attorneys and clients: 1) evidentiary rules prohibiting use 
of information covered by the privilege; and 2) ethical rules 
barring disclosure of privileged information.36  Both rule sets 
embody the notion that effective representation depends on full 
and frank communication between lawyer and client.37  The U.S. 
Supreme Court located a broad policy grounding in this principle 
and used it to justify extension of the privilege to corporate 
clients.38  The Court wrote in Upjohn Co. v. United States that 
effective representation of individuals (and by extension 
corporations) ultimately “serves public ends.”39 
The common-law evidentiary privilege, as used in United 
States courts, traditionally applied to natural persons and 
corporations, but not governments.40  Before 1963, only two 
jurisdictions recognized the government attorney-client privilege.41  
At that time, neither the Model Rules of Evidence nor the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence supported it.42  But both the Model Rules and 
the Uniform Rules eventually addressed the question of 
government privilege.  The drafters of Proposed Model Rule 503 
expanded the definition of “client” to include the government.43  
Though Congress never codified Proposed Rule 503, courts 
throughout the country used it to justify common-law expansion of 
the privilege to include government clients.44  The drafters of 
Uniform Rule 502 proposed a government privilege with a 
narrower scope than that of Proposed Rule 503.45  Rule 502 allowed 
for application only when privileged communication concerned a 
pending claim, action, or investigation, the disclosure of which 
would “seriously impair” the government’s ability to proceed in the 
 
 35. See Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1192.  See also Salkin, supra note 34, at 284. 
 36. Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 802. 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2006).  See Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Salkin, supra note 34, at 288. 
 38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90. 
 39. Id. at 389. 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 501; Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 800. 
 41. Leslie, supra note 33, at 476. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 479. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 480. 
7
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public interest.46  Uniform Rule 502 did not have the impact of 
Proposed Rule 503.47  Courts and state legislatures generally drew 
the government privilege more broadly.48  As it stands today, the 
evidentiary privilege generally protects from disclosure 
communications between attorneys and their government clients 
related to legal advice, but not communications related to policy or 
political advice.49 
Commentators have argued both for and against expansive use 
of the evidentiary privilege to protect government entities.  
Commentators in favor of expansive use argue that uninhibited 
dialogue between government officials and attorneys promotes 
efficient decision making and provides an incentive to acknowledge 
and correct possible misconduct.50  Arguments against expansive 
use include the potential for dishonesty and “total denial of 
information to citizenry about the operations of their 
government.”51 
In addition to the evidentiary bar to disclosure, the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct establish 
ethical boundaries to protect the privilege.52  Specifically, Rule 1.6 
bars attorney disclosure of information related to representation of 
a client.53  Rule 1.13 extends the privilege to public entities and 
operates concurrently with the other Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including Rule 1.6.54  Comment 9 to Rule 1.13 states: 
The duty defined in this Rule applies to government 
organizations.  Defining precisely the identity of the client 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Salkin, supra note 34, at 285.  For a detailed breakdown of the 
elements of common-law attorney-client privilege, see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 at 542 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 50. See generally Ellinwood, supra note 7.  See also Salkin, supra note 34, at 288. 
 51. 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5475 at 127 (1986). 
 52. One commentator identifies the three ethical duties adhering to private 
practitioners as “loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal.”  Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty 
of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 958–59 (1991).  While these terms are somewhat 
abstract, courts and ethicists have been able to define them with enough clarity for 
private practitioners to have reasonable guidance in solving ethical problems.  The 
government attorney, however, has been burdened with a fourth ethical duty: 
serving the public interest.  Id. at 967.  As this casenote asserts, the “public 
interest” is a term so malleable as to be almost meaningless.  See infra pp. 689–92. 
 53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). 
 54. Id. R. 1.13. 
8
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and prescribing the obligations of such lawyers may be 
more difficult in the government context and is a matter 
beyond the scope of these Rules. . . .  [W]hen the client is 
a governmental organization, a different balance may be 
appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and 
assuring that [a] wrongful act is prevented.55 
The Advisory Committee apparently recognized the tensions 
inherent in the duty of an attorney serving a government client.  
Comment 9 seems to suggest government attorneys should err on 
the side of disclosure, given the difficulty in determining whose 
interests predominate in such a situation: the government 
organization or the public it ostensibly represents.  The balancing 
test suggested by Comment 9 operates somewhat like a fuse—if the 
public interest in disclosure is powerful enough, the duty to 
maintain confidentiality shuts down.  Deciding when to remove this 
duty requires a complex calculation.  This calculation inevitably 
reveals deep-seated values about the nature of government and 
how to determine the “public interest.” 
Generally, courts have found that fidelity to the “public 
interest” narrows the scope of government attorneys’ duty to 
maintain confidentiality.  One commentator has noted several 
differences between ethical standards applied to government 
attorneys and those applied to private practitioners.56  He 
concludes that these differences arise from the government 
attorneys’ uniquely acute duty to serve the “public interest.”57  
Given the nebulous nature of this animating value, any bright-line 
rules controlling application of the government attorney-client 
 
 55. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 9. 
 56. See Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations That Follow 
From Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty To Serve The Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 13, 67 (2003).  Professor Berenson charts several primary differences between 
government attorneys and private practitioners as suggested by the courts: 
government attorneys have 1) a greater duty to provide information to the courts 
and opposing parties, both during discovery and in situations resembling a civil 
version of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 2) a higher threshold for 
pleading, implicating issues of fairness, and justice; 3) a lower threshold for what 
litigation tactics are permissible; 4) a narrower scope of confidentiality afforded to 
their clients; and 5) wider latitude in pursuing cases that might otherwise create a 
conflict of interest.  Id. at 16, 18–19, 47.  The last difference seems inconsistent 
with the others in that it allows government lawyers more latitude than private 
practitioners.  Professor Berenson suggests, however, that all these differences 
have the common thread of privileging the public interest over the interests of 
individual parties.  Id. at 67–69. 
 57. Id. at 68–69. 
9
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privilege appear doomed to generate incoherent and inconsistent 
results. 
Thus, despite extensive evidentiary and ethical rules, the 
contours of government attorney-client privilege remain hazy at 
best.58  It even remains unclear as to whom the privilege attaches: 
the particular official engaged in the privileged discussion, the 
government agency employing that official, the government as a 
whole, or the public.59  The relevance of this distinction becomes 
apparent when one seeks to determine which policy rationale 
underlies the asserted privilege and how that rationale balances 
with the policy rationales supporting open government.60  The 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 97 asserts, in any 
case, that “no universal definition of the client of a government 
lawyer is possible. . . .  Those who speak for the governmental client 
may differ from one representation to another.  The identity of the 
client may also vary depending on the purpose for which the 
question of identity is posed.”61 
Some commentators argue it is futile to debate what 
constitutes the government client.  Robert P. Lawry highlights the 
futility of this question by invoking Lord Brougham’s oft quoted 
principle of advocacy: “‘[a]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he 
owes the client, knows, that in the discharge of that office, but one 
person in the world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.’”62  
 
 58. See Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1291. 
 59. Id. at 1315. 
 60. Id. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000).  
Comment c goes on to note, “[f]or many purposes, the preferable approach on 
the question presented is to regard the prospective agencies as the clients and to 
regard the lawyers working for the agencies as subject to the direction of those 
officers authorized to act in the matter involved in the representation.”  Id. 
 62. Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 
625, 628 (1979) (quoting Lord Brougham’s speech in defense of Queen Caroline 
before the House of Lords in 1820).  The Lord Brougham quote continues: 
To save that client by all expedient means—to protect that client at all 
hazards and costs to all others, and amongst others to himself—is the 
highest, and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the 
alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring 
upon any other.  Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those 
of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on 
reckless of consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his 
country in confusion for his client’s protection. 
Id. at 628 n.17. 
The tail of this quote illuminates quite clearly the conundrum of the government 
attorney: what to do when the duties of a patriot and those of an advocate are 
10
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Lawry argues fixing a definition of “THAT CLIENT” will eventually 
inhibit a government attorney’s ethical function because that 
function is uniquely susceptible to internal contradictions.  He 
writes: 
Under the present Code of Professional Responsibility, if 
the client can be identified as a single human being, the 
answers to the following questions are identical and can 
be automatically deduced from mere identification of the 
client: (1) Who shall the lawyer take direction from in 
matters to be decided “by the client”? (2) Whose 
“interests” is the lawyer trying to foster or protect? (3) 
Whose “confidences” is the lawyer obliged to respect. . . ?  
For the government lawyer, however, the answer to each 
of these three questions is not necessarily the same.  Even 
within a single question, the answer may differ from 
situation to situation.63 
According to Professor Lawry, a government attorney should 
proceed in reverse-order, asking those three crucial questions first 
in any given situation and through a balancing of the answers 
determine whose interests predominate.64 
The ambiguous nature of the government client is 
compounded by the unintelligibility of the “public interest.”  As 
noted above, courts and commentators suggest that government 
attorneys’ normal ethical duties are circumscribed by their special 
duty to act in the public interest.  But government attorneys are ill 
suited to determine the public interest, as their job is simply to 
implement measures calculated to meet the public interest.  It is 
the officials or agencies served by the attorney who determine what 
practically constitutes the “public interest.”  An attorney whose 
concept of the public interest clashes with the interest advanced by 
those elected officials puts himself in the position of contradicting 
the wishes of the majority.  And, as Judge Easterbrook points out, 
“public interest” is an empty term unless it is being used as a 
euphemism for the aggregated personal interests of the majority: 
[T]here is no virtuous way to aggregate private wills into 
collective decisions.  People of good will have no common 
 
simultaneously inseparable and at odds? 
 63. Id. at 631–32. 
 64. See generally Robert P. Lawry, Who Is the Client of the Federal Government 
Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B. J. 61 (1978) (proposing a 
method by which government attorneys can determine the true identity of their 
client). 
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ground around which to rally!  They have their own 
conceptions of the public interest but no way to insist that 
the collective choice necessarily reflect their views.  We are 
doomed by the logic of majority voting to aggregate 
private preferences rather than to find a public good.65 
Judge Easterbrook’s argument leads him to conclude: “when 
faction dominates the creation of laws, judges cannot interpret laws 
to serve the public interest.”66  In other words, legislative intent 
articulates the “aggregate of private preferences” and not the 
“public interest.”  Through this formulation, Judge Easterbrook 
unmasks judges’ attempts to justify their decisions by appealing to 
the common good.  He reveals those decisions to be motivated by 
judges’ personal values rather than by a judicial aggregation of 
values held by individual members of the community.67 
In the arena of government attorney-client privilege, 
therefore, decisions about when to honor the privilege appear to 
rise from personal interests and values, not the “public interest.”  
Whether it is an attorney trying to determine when to honor the 
privilege, or a judge trying to determine whether to sanction the 
attorney’s actions, the decision maker’s personal values ultimately 
animate the decision.68 
C. Sacramento: The Prototypical Clash 
Soon after state open meeting laws became commonplace, 
conflicts arose between their provisions and the protections 
guaranteed by the government attorney-client privilege.69  These 
 
 65. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1339 (1994). 
 66. Id. at 1346. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Note, Conflicts of Interest and Government Attorneys, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1413–15 (1981) (“One of the principal purposes of government is to provide a set 
of instructions that analyze and define the public interest.  No individual attorney 
can hope to perform this task on his own. . . .  In many situations, there will be 
little distinction between the goal of effective representation of the government 
“client” and that of good government in and of itself.  When there is a conflict, 
however, it is the lawyer’s duty, not just as a lawyer, but also as a public citizen, to 
choose the path more beneficial to the latter goal.”).  The author of the note fails 
to catch the paradox of the above quote: attorneys cannot be unable to define the 
“public interest” yet also be expected to act on that “public interest.”  The point 
remains, however, as Judge Easterbrook established, that an individual’s 
conception of the “public interest” is nothing but his or her personal values 
cloaked in a lofty abstraction. 
 69. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Attorney-Client Exception Under State 
12
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conflicts led to litigation.  The history of this litigation has been 
that of courts ostensibly struggling to balance the values underlying 
open government with those underlying the government 
privilege.70  The courts’ struggles rise from the indeterminate and 
protean nature of those values, as well as the inevitable personal 
biases noted by Judge Easterbrook in the previous section.  The 
seminal California case Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento 
County Board of Supervisors71 provides a clear example of how a 
court’s difficulty in defining the “public interest” can hamstring it 
when it seeks to balance open government with the government 
privilege. 
The Sacramento court sought to resolve a conflict between the 
state open meeting law and the state’s attorney-client privilege 
statute.72  The court balanced the policy interests behind the two 
statutes by precluding arbitrary or unnecessary invocations of 
privilege that would defeat the purpose of the open meeting law.73  
The case proved influential on other state courts, and particularly 
on Minnesota courts.74 
The Sacramento court held that meetings of a county board of 
supervisors with their attorneys could be properly closed, despite 
California’s existing open meeting law (commonly called the 
“Brown Act”).75  The court based its decision on what it perceived 
to be the values underlying the open meeting law.76  It wrote, “the 
right to disclosure is an attribute of citizenship.”77  It further 
suggested that interpreting the law required “inquiry into [its] 
 
Law Making Proceedings by Public Bodies Open to the Public, 34 A.L.R. 5th 591 (1995) 
(comparing cases discussing this issue from thirty-three different states). 
 70. Id.  See also Zitter, supra note 32, at 113. 
 71. 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 11126(e) (West 2006) (effective 1987), as recognized in Funeral Sec. Plans, 
Inc. v. State Bd. Of Funeral Dirs. and Embalmers, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 72. Id.  At the time Sacramento was decided, California’s open meeting law did 
not contain an exception for meetings which might implicate the attorney-client 
privilege.  Id. at 488.  The legislature provided that exception with the enactment 
of section 11126(e), which sets forth extensive but specific guidelines as to the 
type of situations which trigger the attorney-client privilege exception. CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 11126(e). 
 73. Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492. 
 74. See Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 813–16. 
 75. Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492. 
 76.  Id. at 491. 
 77. Id. at 484. 
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objective.”78 
The California Legislature’s purpose statement prologue to its 
open meeting law stated, in part: “[t]he people of this State do not 
yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.  The 
people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants 
the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is 
not good for them to know.”79  Thus, the statute set forth a clear 
definition of representation to guide California courts in 
determining when to allow exceptions to the rule of open 
government. 
The Sacramento court used this definition as the rationale for 
its decision, at one point writing that “[t]here is rarely any purpose 
to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except to conduct some 
part of the decisional process behind closed doors.  Only by 
embracing the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as 
the ultimate step of official action, can an open meeting regulation 
frustrate these evasive devices.”80  In this instance, the court 
expressed a view that the “public interest” value justifying open 
government was consonant with the stated rationale behind the 
open meeting law: personal sovereignty includes the right to 
observe the decisional process of one’s representative. 
The court next defined what it viewed as the “public interest” 
value underlying the government attorney-client privilege: 
The privilege against disclosure is essentially a means for 
achieving a policy objective of the law.  The objective is to 
enhance the value which society places upon legal 
representation by assuring the client full disclosure to the 
attorney unfettered by fear that others will be informed     
. . . . If client and counsel must confer in public view and 
hearing, both privilege and policy are stripped of value.81 
The Sacramento court was thus set to pit one “public interest” 
against another, in an attempt to synthesize the true public interest. 
At this point in its decision, the court began to wrestle with 
synthesis.  First, it stated, “[g]overnment should have no advantage 
in legal strife; neither should it be a second-class citizen. . . .  ‘There 
is a public entitlement to the effective aid of legal counsel in civil 
litigation.  Effective aid is impossible if opportunity for confidential 
 
 78. Id. at 485. 
 79. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 1997) (effective 1953). 
 80. Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487. 
 81. Id. at 489. 
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legal advice is banned.’”82  Here, the court appeared to favor the 
public interest in confidentiality.  But the pendulum swung back 
quickly: 
As ex-lawyers, judges have been exposed to conditioning 
experiences which might induce inflation of the 
privilege’s value.  Actually it poses competing values.  
Professor Wigmore has observed that its benefits are 
indirect and speculative; that, as a testimonial privilege, it 
is worth preserving but is nevertheless an obstacle to the 
investigation of the truth.83 
In this passage, the court clearly expressed its anxiety at defining 
the public interest, worrying over “conditioning experiences” which 
might bias its conception of the broader public good.  The court 
continued to hedge, “[i]n counterthrust to the values expressed in 
the ‘right to know’ slogan, [the privilege] permits an undeniable 
quantum of secrecy and, in overreaching hands, a potential tool of 
evasion.”84  This comment appeared to zero out the scales by 
introducing a new undefined term—“overreaching hands”—that 
supplanted the “public interest.” 
The court then returned to the refuge of legislative intent: 
“[i]mplicit in [the privilege’s] abrogation by implication is the 
assumption that the California Legislature indulged in a knowing 
choice between these two competing interests; that it adopted the 
Brown Act with unmistakable intent to abolish the values inherent 
in the lawyer-client privilege of local boards of government.”85 
Finally, the court abandoned its early attempts to determine 
the “public interest” and found that the open meeting law can 
operate concurrently with the government privilege, as long as the 
privilege is not “overblown beyond its true dimensions.”86 
The court concluded by returning to the point from which it 
started, stating: “[n]either the attorney’s presence nor the 
happenstance of some kind of lawsuit may serve as the pretext for 
secret consultations whose revelation will not injure the public 
interest.”87  As to what constitutes the public interest, or who is to 
 
 82. Id. at 490 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County 
Bd. of Supervisors, 62 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). 
 83. Id. at 491 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 2291, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 492. 
 87. Id. 
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define that interest, the court was mute. 
The California Legislature later superseded Sacramento, 
enacting statutes which set forth specific exceptions to the open 
meeting law, including one permitting closed meetings in the event 
of pending litigation.88 
III.  THE MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW 
Minnesota is one of the many jurisdictions that adopted the 
balancing test approach advanced by the Sacramento court.89  The 
Minnesota Legislature enacted the state’s original open meeting 
law in 1957.90  In its first incarnation, Minnesota’s open meeting law 
did not contain a statement of purpose or a notice provision, did 
not define the term “meeting” as used in the statutory text, and did 
not contain a specific exception for meetings which involved 
privileged communications.91  These gaps have been filled over 
time by decisions from Minnesota courts and by further 
legislation.92 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the conflict 
between government attorney-client privilege and the open 
meeting law in Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709.93  
Channel 10 involved an action brought by a television station 
contesting school-board bylaw exceptions to the open meeting law.  
 
 88. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11126(e) (West 2006); see also Roberts v. City of 
Palmdale, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501, 505 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the legislative 
history to date of California Code provisions allowing exceptions to the open 
meeting law in the case of pending litigation). 
 89. See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 405–06; see also PETER N. 
THOMPSON, MINN. PRAC. Evidence § 501.04, at 246. (3d ed. 2001). 
 90. Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 381. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, 
ch. 773, 1957 Minn. Laws 1043 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 13D.01 
(2004)). 
 91. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1957), amended by MINN. STAT. § 13D.01 (2004).  
See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 384–405. 
 92. See, e.g., Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 683 N.W.2d 
274 (Minn. 2004) (construing the law in favor of public access and applying the 
law to the proceedings of the state university system); Berglund v. City of 
Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D. Minn. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Zick v. City of 
Maplewood, 50 Fed. Appx. 805 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 965 (2003) 
(establishing that a banquet honoring city council members did not qualify as a 
meeting under the open meeting law); Channel 10, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1974) (declining to recognize a 
number of exceptions to the open meeting statute); see also Marshall H. Tanick, 
Clouds Descend on the Minnesota Sunshine Laws, 58 HENNEPIN LAW., July–Aug. 1989, 
at 9. 
 93. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 306, 215 N.W.2d at 814. 
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One of the bylaw exceptions permitted closed meetings where the 
board needed to discuss pending litigation.  The trial court ruled 
this exception was in the public interest.94  At the time Channel 10 
was decided, no statutory attorney-client privilege exception 
specific to the open meeting law existed. 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the trial court 
to task for its reliance on the “public interest,” writing: 
[T]he trial court should not have used the public interest 
as a factor in determining which acts should be enjoined 
since that determination should be a policy decision for 
the legislature.  The wisdom of the open meeting law may 
be debated in the public arena but our role is to enforce 
the statute according to its terms.  If it doesn’t work in the 
public interest, the legislature is the branch of 
government that should change it.95 
Despite this chastisement, the Channel 10 court found itself in the 
same quandary as the Sacramento court: unable to reach a decision 
without reference to the public interest, but with no guide to 
determine just what that interest was and a vague unease about the 
task in general. 
The court initially noted that the government attorney’s 
ultimate client was not the school board but the public at large.96  
The court then speculated, “[w]here tort claims against the school 
district are being discussed by and between the school board and 
its attorney, disclosure might not be in the best interests of the 
public nor in the best interests of the administration of justice.”97 
The court quoted from the Sacramento decision, and also 
mentioned an Arkansas case that barred the privilege exception 
outright.98  At that point, the court appeared no closer to a decision 
than when it started.99  The court ultimately concluded, given the 
 
 94. Id. at 308, 215 N.W.2d at 822.  The trial court wrote, “Inasmuch as the 
Board . . . are adversaries to other interests in some of their considerations, it must 
be obvious that the Board should have the advantage afforded their adversaries in 
the matter of confidential discussion with their attorneys over litigation . . . .”  Id. 
at 317, 215 N.W.2d at 823. 
 95. Id. at 317, 215 N.W.2d at 823. 
 96. Id. at 322, 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 97. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 98. Id. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.  The court quotes from a passage in 
Sacramento in which the court tries to define the public interest in confidentiality 
and the public interest in open government.  See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. 
Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 99. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
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novelty of the issue, that it should employ restraint.100  It suggested 
courts use a case-by-case balancing test to determine when the 
privilege exception is appropriate.101  This suggestion was the seed 
from which the Prior Lake decision ultimately emerged.102  It further 
determined that in the case at bar, the pending litigation exception 
was too broad.103  The decision about what would be an appropriate 
closing could only be made if available facts showed which choice 
would most benefit the public interest.104 
The supreme court first applied the Channel 10 balancing test 
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment 
Authority (HRA).105  Unlike Channel 10, HRA generated sufficient 
facts to actually apply the test.106  HRA involved a meeting that was 
closed to discuss pending litigation against the Housing and 
Redevelopment Authority that environmental activists had filed.107 
The HRA court relied extensively on the Sacramento decision in 
formulating its solution.108  The court acknowledged that its task 
required “a delicate balancing of public interests.”109  It did not shy 
away from this task—querying, for instance, whether closed 
meetings would truly benefit the “public.”  But the court never 
explicitly set forth what it felt was the particular “public interest” in 
this case.  It relied instead on boilerplate language invoking the 
principles of “democracy” and the “adversary system.”110 
The HRA court ultimately held that the “active and 
immediate” nature of the pending litigation justified application of 
the privilege.111  At the time, the action was pending in federal 
district court; the closed meeting was necessary to prevent unfair 
strategic advantage to the private parties involved in the 
 
 100. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 101. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 102. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. (HRA), 310 
Minn. 313, 321–23, 251 N.W.2d 620, 624–25 (Minn. 1976).  The Prior Lake decision 
ultimately incorporated this principle from HRA.  Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 738. 
 103. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 104. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826. 
 105. HRA, 310 Minn. at 313, 251 N.W.2d at 620; Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 306, 
215 N.W.2d at 814. 
 106. HRA, 310 Minn. at 313, 251 N.W.2d at 620; Channel 10 298 Minn. at 306, 
215 N.W.2d at 814. 
 107. See HRA, 310 Minn. at 314, 251 N.W.2d at 621. 
 108. Id. at 320–21, 251 N.W.2d at 624; see also Note, Open Meeting Law and the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 250, 255 (1978). 
 109. HRA, 310 Minn. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625. 
 110. Id. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625. 
 111. Id. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626. 
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litigation.112  But by allowing closed meetings convened to discuss 
settlement possibilities, the court implied that economic interests 
can trump “democratic” interests when the threat against those 
economic interests is sufficiently clear.  This unstated but apparent 
preference is revealing.  It suggests that the court believes 
preservation of economic rights to be the primary goal of our 
political system, without saying so outright. 
But the court hedged against wide application of the privilege.  
It wrote that the privilege exception should be “invoked cautiously 
and seldom in situations other than in relation to threatened or 
pending litigation.”113  This approach muddied the waters by not 
defining “threatened or pending litigation”114 and led to conflicting 
decisions which Prior Lake ultimately resolved. 
Two major Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions followed 
from HRA.  The first was Northwest Publications, Inc. v. St. Paul.115  In 
Northwest Publications, the court applied the balancing test used in 
HRA.116  The case involved a petition for writ of mandamus to open 
a city council meeting previously scheduled to be closed.117  The 
meeting was to be closed so the council could discuss with its 
lawyers the legal ramifications of a proposed nude-dancing 
ordinance.118  The court concluded that legal advice as to the 
possibility of litigation over a proposed ordinance did not justify 
application of the attorney-client privilege exception.119  The court 
wrote: 
 
 112. Id. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625. 
 113. Id. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626.  Strangely enough, in its dicta, the HRA 
court also made passing reference to the generally rejected First Amendment 
grounds for the right to open government.  Later decisions by Minnesota courts 
did not adopt this policy basis for the open meeting law.  See Tanick, supra note 92, 
at 23. 
 114. Compare James S. Holmes & David C. Graven, 33 BENCH AND BAR MINN., 
Feb. 1977, at 25–38 (the authors engage in a written colloquy with lawyers from 
HRA in an attempt to sort out the implications for practitioners), with CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 11126(e) (West 2005) (this section of California’s open meeting law sets 
forth in clear detail what constitutes pending litigation for the purpose of applying 
the attorney-client privilege exception to the law). 
 115. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 116. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 64; HRA, 310 Minn. at 323, 251 
N.W.2d at 625. 
 117. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 65. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 67.  In distinguishing from the HRA decision, the Northwest 
Publications court noted that in HRA the litigation had been commenced, where in 
the present case it was merely a possibility (albeit a likely possibility given the 
hostile stance taken by stakeholders in the decision).  Id. 
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It is not clear that closure of public meetings reduces the 
risk of future litigation . . . .  In some situations, the only 
feasible way to avoid litigation may be to abandon 
enactment of controversial proposals.  The decision 
whether to adopt or abandon a proposal, however, is just 
the sort of decision which should be made openly.120 
Once again, without stating it outright, the court seemed to weigh 
not just the public interest in general, but the public economic 
interest.  Thus, the Northwest Publications court seems to suggest that 
where the threat to the economic interest is unclear, or the best 
manner in which to protect the economic interest is too difficult to 
divine, courts should defer to the presumption of openness present 
in the open meeting law. 
In 1990, on the heels of the Northwest Publications decision, the 
Minnesota Legislature amended the open meeting law to include 
an attorney-client privilege exception.121  The amended statute 
provided minimal guidance to the courts.  The new exception read, 
“meetings may be closed if the closure is expressly . . . permitted by 
the attorney-client privilege.”122 
Star Tribune v. Board of Education, Special School123 was the first 
case to apply this new statutory privilege exception.  The Star 
Tribune court interpreted the exception as consistent with the 
contours of the privilege as developed in HRA.124  But the court 
held, seemingly contra Northwest Publications, that the privilege 
exception operated when a public agency needed legal advice 
regarding “specific acts and their legal consequences,” even if 
litigation had not been explicitly threatened.125  In doing so, it 
seemed to reach a different conclusion about what clarity of 
economic threat justified closed meetings. 
Star Tribune involved a mandamus petition filed in the wake of 
a closed school board meeting.126  The board closed the meeting to 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. MINN. STAT. § 471.05, subdiv. 1(d)(e) (1998) (current version at MINN. 
STAT. § 13D.01 (2004)).  In 2000, the Minnesota Legislature renumbered chapter 
471 as chapter 13D.  MINN. STAT. § 13D.01 (2004). 
 123. 507 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 124. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. (HRA), 310 
Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 1976); Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 
871. 
 125. Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 871; Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 68. 
872. 
 126. Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 870. 
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discuss financial mismanagement by the district superintendent.127  
When the meeting reopened, the board announced its suspension 
of the superintendent.128  The board then scheduled a future closed 
meeting to discuss possible litigation against the superintendent.129  
The Star Tribune newspaper obtained a writ of mandamus from 
the trial court that ordered the follow-up board meeting to be 
open, unless litigation had “actually commenced.”130  The board 
promptly appointed an investigator to obtain information on the 
superintendent’s misdeeds and make recommendations to the 
board.131  The board determined that this step “commenced” 
litigation.  It then held several closed meetings, which eventually 
resulted in settlement with the superintendent.132  The board also 
appealed the writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court 
misinterpreted the new statutory privilege exception to the open 
meeting law.133  The Star Tribune court concluded that because legal 
action was “imminent or threatened,” government privilege should 
apply.134  The court wrote, “[a] meeting may be closed pursuant to 
the attorney-client exception when a governing body seeks legal 
advice concerning litigation strategy, but not when the discussion 
focuses on the underlying merits that might give rise to future 
litigation.”135  Once again, the court had somehow calculated the 
public interest but given no guidance as to how or why it reached 
its decision. 
So, the Star Tribune and Northwest Publications courts disagreed 
on what constituted “threatened litigation” sufficient to trigger the 
attorney-client privilege exception.136  More broadly, the two courts 
differed on how to balance the public interest in openness against 
the public interest in government privilege.  Their disagreement 
demonstrated the difficulty in implementing a law that calls for 
judicial interpretation of the “public interest” every time the law is 
enforced.  Tellingly, neither Northwest Publications nor Star Tribune 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 871. 
 136. See Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 869 and Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. St. Paul, 
435 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
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addressed the trouble government attorneys might have using 
those decisions as guides about when to close meetings. 
IV.  THE PRIOR LAKE DECISION 
A. Facts 
On February 7, 2000, the Prior Lake City Council held an 
open meeting to consider a conditional use permit (CUP) 
application filed by Ryan Contracting Co.137  The council also 
considered a petition for an environmental impact study that 
sometimes accompanied CUP applications.138  At the meeting, city 
staff members recommended the council approve the CUP and 
deny the petition.139  The council members then heard testimony 
related to the application and petition.140  When the testimony 
finished, Mayor Wes Mader introduced into the discussion a letter 
that had been sent to the City by Ryan Contracting, threatening 
litigation should the City deny its application or grant the petition 
for an environmental impact study.141  Mayor Mader then suggested 
the council retire into a closed executive session so the council 
members could discuss the matter with their attorney.142  With one 
of the council members disagreeing, the rest of the council 
adjourned into the closed meeting without him.143 
The Prior Lake American is a newspaper published in Prior 
Lake, Minnesota.144  It brought a declaratory judgment action 
 
 137. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. 2002). 
 138. Id. The record does not reflect who petitioned for the environmental 
impact study.  Id. at 732 n.2. 
 139. Id. at 732. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 732–33.  The letter expressly mentioned litigation, stating, “Ryan 
Contracting may seek legal action to ensure proper handling and compliance of 
this matter, as well as legal action to recover lost revenues and/or costs incurred as 
a result of actions by the city of Prior Lake.”  Id. at 733. 
 142. Id.  The meeting minutes show some debate over whether or not to enter 
into the closed session, with the Mayor’s argument that the “threat of litigation” 
allowed closure eventually winning the day.  Id. 
 143. Id.  When the open meeting reconvened, the Mayor and another council 
member made statements for the record explaining why they chose to hold the 
closed session.  Id. at 733–34.  They apparently felt that publicly discussing the 
matter with their attorney would compromise their ability to be frank and might 
affect them negatively in any future litigation.  Id.  They eventually granted the 
petition for the environmental impact study.  Id. at 734. 
 144. Id. at 731. 
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asking the court to find that the Prior Lake City Council violated 
the Minnesota open meeting law when it closed its February 7, 
2000, meeting.145  The district court granted the city council’s 
motion for summary judgment.146  It held that because the council 
demonstrated there was a specific threat of litigation, the attorney-
client privilege exception to the open meeting law applied.147 
The Prior Lake American appealed, and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court decision.148  The court of appeals 
found support in Star Tribune’s holding that the privilege could 
operate even when litigation was imminent but not commenced.149  
It further noted that Northwest Publications was no longer dispositive, 
since it had been decided before the statutory enactment of the 
open meeting law’s attorney-client privilege exception.150  The Prior 
Lake American appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
B. Reasoning 
The supreme court’s Prior Lake decision can be divided into 
two parts.  First, the court reaffirmed the use of the HRA balancing 
test to settle conflicts between attorney-client privilege and the 
open meeting law.151  Second, it refined the category of 
“threatened” litigation first proposed in HRA and held this category 
subject to the HRA balancing test.152  But it noted that application 
of the privilege exception in situations of “threatened litigation” 
requires a more substantial showing of the need for confidentiality 
than in situations of “pending” litigation.153 
The supreme court began its analysis by reiterating the policy 
purposes of the open meeting law: 
The Open Meeting Law serves several purposes: (1) “to 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 734. 
 147. Id.  In reaching its decision, the district court applied the HRA balancing 
test and concluded that the need for confidentiality in this situation outweighed 
the public’s right to access.  Id. 
 148. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, No. C7-00-1909, 2001 WL 379090, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2001). 
 149. Id. at *2.  The court of appeals wrote: “[i]n response to a threat from the 
contractor, [the city council] needed timely legal advice on specific acts and their 
consequences.  That need justified the application of the exception.”  Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 736 (Minn. 2002). 
 152. Id. at 736, 738.  See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. 
Auth. (HRA), 310 Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 1976). 
 153. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 736, 738. 
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prohibit actions being taken at a secret meeting where it is 
impossible for the interested public to become fully 
informed concerning [public bodies’] decisions or to 
detect improper influences”; (2) “to assure the public’s 
right to be informed”; and (3) “to afford the public an 
opportunity to present its views to the [public body].”154 
It rooted these policies in the principle that a well-informed public 
is the bedrock of a successful democracy.155  It then located the 
origins of the HRA balancing test in Sacramento, quoting at length 
from both cases.156  The supreme court noted repeatedly during 
this discussion that courts have traditionally shied away from an 
“unfettered” application of the privilege exception.157 
Finally, the court dismissed Respondent’s argument that the 
exception should apply whenever litigation is threatened.158  In 
doing so, it stated that Minnesota’s statutory privilege exception 
comports with the HRA balancing test and the HRA test should be 
used when applying the exception.159  The court applied a canon of 
construction that invests ambiguous statutory terms with meanings 
acquired through repeated prior judicial use.160  In constructing the 
statute, the court did not “discern any intent” on the part of the 
legislature to abrogate the privilege exception as defined in HRA.161  
The court concluded, “attorney-client privilege is . . . constrained 
by the Open Meeting Law.”162  In other words, the privilege 
exception to the open meeting law should be construed more 
narrowly than the general attorney-client privilege.  Proper 
reduction of the privilege’s scope must be determined on a case-by-
case basis, since the precise interest supporting the privilege differs 
from case to case. 
Once the court had established the relevance of the HRA test, 
 
 154. Id. at 735 (quoting St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. Dist. 742 Cmty. Schs., 
332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1983)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 736. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 738. 
 159. Id. at 737–38. 
 160. “Words and phrases which have acquired an established meaning by 
judicial construction are deemed to be used in the same sense in a subsequent 
statute relating to the same subject matter.”  Id. at 737, (quoting Minn. Wood 
Specialties, Inc. v. Mattson, 274 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1978)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 737–38. 
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it applied that test to the circumstances of Prior Lake.163  In contrast 
with HRA, Prior Lake involved threatened litigation related to a 
governmental decision that had not yet been made.164  The court 
worried that if a public body closes its meetings when deliberating 
whether or not to take some action, even if litigation is a possible 
result of their decision, the closure will prevent the public from 
providing input and exercising oversight.165  Thus, the public’s 
interest in open meetings when a decision is being contemplated 
appears more significant than its interest in open meetings when 
the consequences of a prior decision are being discussed.166  This 
conception of the public interest is consistent with that suggested 
by previous Minnesota open meeting law decisions, in that it 
appears to place a premium on the public’s economic interests.167 
The Prior Lake court did not claim that the privilege exception 
will never operate prior to a substantive decision.  But it noted that 
invoking the privilege under those circumstances is “fraught with 
peril.”168  The court held that since the Prior Lake city council 
invoked the privilege exception unnecessarily during its decision-
making process, the exception should not apply.169 
In his dissent, Justice Gilbert also applied the HRA test, but 
arrived at a different result.170  He felt the policy interest of keeping 
this particular meeting open did not outweigh the need for the 
council to receive confidential advice from its attorney.171  He 
claimed the majority ignored the facts of the case and 
surreptitiously applied a bright-line rule precluding the privilege 
exception unless litigation has actually been commenced.172  Justice 
Gilbert suggested that use of this bright-line rule would ultimately 
 
 163. Id. at 738. 
 164. Id. at 741. 
 165. Id. at 741–42. 
 166. Id.  See Leslie, supra note 33, at 486–90 and text accompanying for 
arguments supporting the position that pre-conduct legal advice to public officials 
should not be covered by the attorney-client privilege. 
 167. For instance, in Channel 10, the court noted while discussing the public 
interest that, “[w]here tort claims against the school district are being discussed by 
and between the school board and its attorney, disclosure might not be in the best 
interests of the public.”  Channel 10, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 
306, 322, 215 N.W.2d 814, 826 (1974).  One can infer here that the term “best 
interests” actually refers to “economic interests.” 
 168. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 741. 
 169. Id. at 742. 
 170. Id. (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 743. 
 172. Id. 
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discourage individuals from seeking government office and could 
result in increased legal costs to the public.173  To support his 
position, Justice Gilbert invoked the potentially negative economic 
consequences of narrowing the privilege exception.  For instance, 
he wrote: 
When there is a real threat of litigation relating to their 
decisions, [public officials] should be allowed to seek legal 
counsel.  This fundamental proposition is particularly 
compelling when, as here, the threatened litigation 
includes claims for damages against the city itself . . . .  
Without legal advice, the council may fail to take proper 
legal considerations into account in making its decision 
and unwittingly expose its taxpayer constituents to 
potentially millions of dollars of damages. . . .  [I]f a 
mistake is made and the city unknowingly or unwittingly 
makes a legal blunder because of its inability to consult 
with its attorney in private, the taxpayers are the ones who 
really lose.174 
While Justice Gilbert’s application of the HRA test did not carry the 
day, he did explicitly provide an economic rationale for his 
conception of the public interest.175  Ironically, the extra analysis 
provided in his dissent gives practitioners more guidance than the 
majority opinion; it listed specific economic factors, including the 
threat of money damages and the potential impact on taxpayers.176 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIOR LAKE DECISION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court took a positive step in Prior 
Lake by constricting the attorney-client privilege exception to the 
open meeting law.  Both elements of its decision were crucial to 
reestablishing the force of the open meeting law: the reaffirmation 
of the HRA balancing test (which had been imperiled by the Star 
Tribune decision), as well as the refinement of the “threatened” 
litigation category.177  Furthermore, its ruling preserved the 
 
 173. Id. at 745. 
 174. Id. at 743, 745. 
 175. Id. at 745. 
 176. Id. at 743–45. 
 177. See Moberg v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Minn. 
1983) (“Legislative history suggests that the Open Meeting Law was enacted to 
prevent public bodies from dissolving into executive session on important but 
controversial matters, and to insure that the public has an opportunity both to 
detect improper influences and to present its views.”).  See also Tanick, supra note 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/8
8. RIACH - RC.DOC 3/7/2007  1:26:07 PM 
2007] PRIOR LAKE AMERICAN V. MADER 707 
supposition that the government attorneys’ real client is the public, 
and not the officials who represent the public—a supposition 
necessary to ensure honest and efficient government.178  
Unfortunately, the court did not take the final and necessary step 
of stating explicitly the values it weighed in making its 
determination.  Its decision provides courts with a tool to use when 
resolving similar conflicts.  Unfortunately, it did not provide 
practitioners with effective guidance in how to know when a closed 
meeting is acceptable. 
The HRA balancing test is the best way to ensure efficient use 
of the privilege exception.179  It encourages government agencies to 
weigh the need for absolute confidentiality against the public’s 
interest in open deliberations before closing a meeting.  Since 
officials know that they will not be sued under the open meeting 
law if they meet publicly, it encourages them to err on the side of 
openness.180  A bright-line test allowing for invocation of privilege 
whenever litigation is threatened, or even mentioned, would 
inevitably result in unnecessary use of the privilege. 
Furthermore, unconditional extension of the privilege to pre-
conduct legal advice—advice given before the government takes 
action that could induce litigation—would have severely 
compromised the policy purposes of the open meeting law.181  
 
92, at 9.  Writing in 1989, Mr. Tanick lamented, “The Minnesota Open Meeting 
Law was once regarded as the most expansive legislation of its kind in the country 
for maximizing oversight of the workings of government . . . . [But the] Sunshine 
laws are no longer so luminescent.”  Id.  Mr. Tanick was undoubtedly cheered by 
the Prior Lake ruling. 
 178. This is a contentious position that is hotly debated by commentators.  See 
Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1315–17; Leslie, supra note 33, at 479; Salkin, supra 
note 34, at 301–02; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 51, § 5475. 
 179. It is useful to compare the HRA test with tests from more restrictive 
jurisdictions.  For instance, Florida courts so narrowly construe their attorney-
client privilege exception that they acknowledge the results generate uncertainty 
but refuse to alter their approach.  See Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 812–
13. 
 180. Unfortunately for advocates of open government, enforcement of open 
meeting laws has proved difficult and often ineffective.  The author of Minnesota 
Open Meeting Law surveyed the enforcement mechanisms available in Minnesota—
injunctions, invalidation of government actions, criminal penalties and fines—and 
concluded that officials’ willingness to conduct open meetings depends as much 
on their perceived moral duty to the public as to the coercive power of the law.  
Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 419. 
 181. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 490–91.  Professor Leslie suggests that 
extension of the privilege to pre-conduct legal advice may encourage 
noncompliance since it gives a client an advantage in knowing how to decrease the 
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Almost any government decision can create the opportunity for 
litigation.  The potential for litigation is but one of the factors 
public officials consider when making decisions.182  It would be 
naïve to think officials could engage in discussions about the costs 
and benefits of proceeding with a decision in the face of litigation 
without considering other policy and political factors.183  If the 
public is not privy to those discussions, it cannot effectively 
supervise the use of its resources or assess the wisdom of its 
representatives.184  By constricting the privilege exception to its 
absolute minimum scope when applied to pre-conduct legal advice, 
the Prior Lake court preserved citizens’ ability to guarantee effective 
government. 
Unfortunately, Prior Lake fails to give legal practitioners 
effective guidance.  The court left a number of very important 
questions unanswered.  For instance: How does one determine the 
public interest?  What if the person making that determination is 
an attorney whose usual function is to serve elected officials 
specially charged with acting in the public interest?  What if the 
attorney’s and official’s conceptions of the public interest clash?  
How is the attorney to proceed?  Most importantly, how will an 
attorney know when a closed meeting will survive judicial scrutiny?  
Justice Gilbert’s dissent at least gives practitioners some touchstone 
as to how the court goes about calculating the public interest.  
Government lawyers, government clients, and the public at large 
 
odds of detection of misconduct and minimize the potential sanctions that might 
result.  Id. (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
29–30 (1998)). 
 182. In its amicus brief, the League of American Cities makes the standard 
argument that if a government attorney is forced to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of a public agency’s legal position, the government will be 
disadvantaged in future litigation.  Brief for League of Minnesota Cities as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at *13, Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729 
(Minn. 2002) (No. C7-00-1909), 2001 WL 34677566.  But it is unlikely, given the 
liberal discovery rules available, that much of what could be communicated in an 
abstract discussion of potential liability would be protected or would benefit the 
government if kept secret. 
 183. In Prior Lake, the supreme court noted that the record did not reflect the 
content of the city council’s closed Feb. 7, 2000, meeting, but it seemed dubious 
that what occurred behind closed doors contributed in any way to “litigation 
strategy” or was limited to strictly legal advice.  See Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 
N.W.2d 729, 740 (Minn. 2002). 
 184. “When the public is only allowed to witness the final outcome of 
deliberations, the public is denied access to governmental decision-making 
because the reasoning behind the final outcome is not disclosed.”  Pupillo, supra 
note 14, at 1179. 
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will benefit if in similar future decisions the majority specifies the 
component parts of the public interests it balances. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Before Prior Lake, the attorney-client privilege exception 
threatened to defang Minnesota’s open meeting law.185  Now, the 
HRA balancing test is well established and courts will not likely 
allow the privilege to operate during decision-making except in 
extreme situations.  Two open meeting law cases decided since 
Prior Lake confirm that Prior Lake protected the public interest 
without compromising the government’s ability to address 
prospective litigation.186  One case aggressively promoted the public 
interest in open meetings;187 the other case protected a city 
council’s ability to use the privilege exception when appropriate.188  
Together, they show that the Prior Lake test is an effective tool 
Minnesota courts can use to decide when the privilege exception 
should operate.  The fact that two similar cases arose right on the 
heels of Prior Lake also shows, however, that Prior Lake failed to set 
forth guidelines specific enough that practitioners can rely on 
them to stay out of court. 
 
 
 185. See Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 742. 
 186. Free Press v. County of Blue Earth, 677 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004) (reiterating the narrow application of the attorney-client privilege exception 
to the open meeting law and requiring a municipality to state specific grounds for 
using the privilege to close a meeting); Brainerd Daily Dispatch v. Dehen, 693 
N.W.2d 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (using the Prior Lake balancing test, the court 
held the attorney-client privilege exception operated where city council denied 
parade permit and applying organization threatened litigation and took several 
affirmative steps toward filing suit). 
 187. See Free Press, 677 N.W.2d at 477.  The court wrote, “Narrow construction 
of exceptions to the open meeting law advances the legislative purpose to support 
broad public access to the decisions of public bodies.”  Id. 
 188. See Brainerd Daily Dispatch, 693 N.W.2d at 443. 
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